The Iraq Supplemental, H.R. 1591, received a Bush veto today and already there is a debate opening up among Democrats about what comes next.
It is imperative that Congressional Democrats stay unified, hold Bush accountable and do so with the force of law.
This diary will:
a) highlight the significance of November 2007 as a benchmark of Bush's own making
b) highlight the significance of March 2008 as a national consensus date for the withdrawal of our combat forces
c) discuss the relevant text of H.R. 1591 as a way of discussing what comes next and holding Bush and Congress accountable to the will of the voters in 2006.
The goal of this diary is to provide a framework for Democrats to stand together and hold Bush accountable and bring the troops home sooner rather than later using Bush's own promises and his own words regarding Iraq.
Introduction:
This discussion on TalkLeft highlighted the basic Democratic conventional wisdom regarding the impending battle between Congress and the President on Iraq. In a nutshell, according to this view, Democrats, while not having the political power to pass legislation forcing Bush's hand regarding withdrawal from Iraq can force the President and the GOP to "own the war" and make the war in Iraq the defining issue of the 2008 elections.
Now, within the Democratic party there is also a strong, but small contingent of Out Now Congresspersons (ie. those voting against the Iraq supplemental like Barbara Lee, Maxine Waters and Lynne Woolsey) and two competing advocates of different uses of the "Power of the Purse": Russ Feingold's plan and John Murtha's short leash proposal. (Which, if you read to the end of this article, has got a head of steam going.)
I would like to suggest a way to reconcile these competing views that both holds the Democratic caucus together and provides a framework for a "sooner rather than later" withdrawal from Iraq.
To do this, we need to burn these two dates into the public discourse about the war: November 2007 and March 2008.
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November 2007 and Bush's Surge:
George Bush had very little specific to say in his January 11th announcement of the "Surge" policy of escalation in Iraq. This was deliberate; strategic vagueness meant the President could not be held accountable for failing to meet benchmarks or timetables. Lost in the public debate following Bush's announcement were two critical aspects of Bush's position. First, the President rejected the bi-partisan findings of the Iraq Study Group. (More on this later.) Second, the President did, however, set one firm, hard date in his speech: November of 2007. Democrats need to revisit that:
I have made it clear to the prime minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people - and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act. [snip]
America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced.
To establish its authority, the Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November.
This is the one firm date the President provided in his speech, and yet, as revealed by David Sanger in the New York Times, "senior Administration officials" are throwing that benchmark our the window.:
The Bush administration will not try to assess whether the troop increase in Iraq is producing signs of political progress or greater security until September, and many of Mr. Bush’s top advisers now anticipate that any gains by then will be limited, according to senior administration officials.
In interviews over the past week, the officials made clear that the White House is gradually scaling back its expectations for the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. The timelines they are now discussing suggest that the White House may maintain the increased numbers of American troops in Iraq well into next year.
In other words, the administration is all but admitting that they will miss Bush's November 2007 deadline for the Iraqi government to take responsibility for security in every province. Bush is going back on his own words.
In fact, Secretary of Defense Gates, in that very same article, makes it clear that even to simply get "outputs" by September (outputs being a code word for getting the Iraqis to put in writing their mere intention to do something) the Iraqi parliament will have to stay in session over the summer. As we learned yesterday, the Iraqis will do no such thing.
Congressional Democrats must raise this issue and this date now. November 2007 also happens to be the one year anniversary of the elections of 2006 in which the voters of the United States unequivocally chose to send a party to Congress committed to a reponsible, phased withdrawal from Iraq.
Congressional Democrats must hold this President accountable to his own words regarding the November 2007 date. We must bring the full force of this political pressure to bear on the President in the negotiations over the "next bill."
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March 2008 and the Iraq Study Group:
As I quote above, the President was clear last January:
I have made it clear to the prime minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people
In that same speech, however, the President notably pushed aside the consensus view of both recently-elected Democratic Majorities (for a run-down of the Iraq positions of Senators Webb, Tester and McCaskill, read here) and the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.
I am not advocating a wholesale endorsement of the Iraq Study Group's position. However, it is notable that this bi-partisan, unquestionably establishment (and pro-oil lobby) group made this explicit recommendation in the executive summary linked above:
The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in Iraq.
The end of the first quarter of 2008 is March of 2008. This, in my view, is the other date that the Democratic Party must use to force the President's hand on Iraq.
March of 2008 represents a consensus view among leading centrist Democrats and the bi-partisan Iraq Study Group for an end point of our current use of American combat forces to effectively do the job of the Iraqi military in Iraq. If November 2007 is the President's self-imposed yardstick, then March of 2008 is the hard and fast deadline for the completion of a major change in the United States military commitment in Iraq. Whether it is Claire McCaskill's formulation:
During the next two years, we need to transition to a multinational security force and redeploy our troops to best protect our long term national security interest.
Or that of Senator Jim Webb from January of this year:
We need a new direction. Not one step back from the war against international terrorism. Not a precipitous withdrawal that ignores the possibility of further chaos. But an immediate shift toward strong regionally based diplomacy, a policy that takes our soldiers off the streets of Iraq's cities, and a formula that will in short order allow our combat forces to leave Iraq.
{GregP has this fantastic piece up on what Webb is saying right now in response to Bush's veto.}
It is clear that centrist Democrats running in states like Virginia and Missouri promised their voters a change of course in Iraq consonent with this March of 2008 timeframe for a withdrawal of U.S. combat forces. The question we should ask of any Democrat or moderate Republican who opposes this deadline is this: why is a plan that has the support of the Iraq Study Group and Senators like Chuck Hagel, Claire McCaskill and Jim Webb not good enough for you?
It is my view that the job of the left of the Democratic party and of the progressive netroots is to use these two dates, November of 2007 and March of 2008, to push the Democratic majorities in Congress to create a hard and fast legal deadline for this President, using the power of the purse. We must hold our coalition together at the same time as we hold the President accountable with the force of law.
Even as many here in the netroots would find this timeframe unacceptable, it may be that even this goal is not politically possible. To see why, let's take a look a the bill that the President is set to veto.
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Bush's Veto and the text of H.R. 1591:
The sections of the Iraq Supplemental that are immediately germane to the Iraq debate are sections 1901-1904 under General Provisions. (If that link doesn't work, go here and follow the link on the left.)
One of the first ways we can hold Bush accountable is to understand exactly what his veto rejects. Here is the core text, Section 1904 edited into bullet points for ease of reading:
SEC. 1904. (a) The President shall make and transmit to Congress the following determinations, along with reports in classified and unclassified form detailing the basis for each determination, on or before July 1, 2007--
(1)
- whether the Government of Iraq has given United States Armed Forces and Iraqi Security Forces the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias, and is making substantial progress in delivering necessary Iraqi Security Forces for Baghdad and protecting such Forces from political interference
- intensifying efforts to build balanced security forces throughout Iraq that provide even-handed security for all Iraqis
- ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces
- eliminating militia control of local security
- establishing a strong militia disarmament program
- ensuring fair and just enforcement of laws
- establishing political, media, economic, and service committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan
- eradicating safe havens
(2)
- whether the Government of Iraq is making substantial progress in meeting its commitment to pursue reconciliation initiatives, including enactment of a hydro-carbon law
- adoption of legislation necessary for the conduct of provincial and local elections
- reform of current laws governing the de-Baathification process
- amendment of the Constitution of Iraq
- and allocation of Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects
(3) whether the Government of Iraq and United States Armed Forces are making substantial progress in reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq; and
(4) whether the Government of Iraq is ensuring the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi Parliament are protected.
(b) If the President fails to make any of the determinations specified in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall commence the redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq no later than July 1, 2007, with a goal of completing such redeployment within 180 days.
(c) If the President makes the determinations specified in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall commence the redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq not later than October 1, 2007, with a goal of completing such redeployment within 180 days.
This bill, which fully funds the United States Armed Forces world wide, gives 4 sets of "determinations" to the President. As you can see, these determinations do not, on first impression, strike the reader as providing many clear, measurable yardsticks or a clear, measurable timeline for obligating the President in Iraq. There are many qualifiers here that provide wiggle room like "substantial progress" and "balanced security forces." There is another aspect of this bill: "goal language." The highlighted passages in the bill make it clear that the President, who is the one who makes the determinations, by the way, merely has to have a "goal" of redeployment within 180 days...depending on his determinations.
The bill the President is about to veto, even as it would put him in a vise-grip of intense political pressure, would not bind him to a deadline with the force of law. It would not threaten to cut off funds if the President does not meet clear cut goals.
Moving forward, as Democrats debate the next step and the "next bill" we should be very clear what the vetoed bill was and was not. At the same time as left and anti-war Democrats have an obligation to maintain party unity, we also have an obligation to hold the Democratic leadership accountable to the will of the voters in the elections of 2006 and the clear understanding of the public that, however we do it, the Democratic majorities in the 110th Congress came to Washgington to effect a change of course in Iraq that would, in Jon Tester's words, "bring our troops home."
That was the basic meaning of the election of 2006. In no uncertain terms, the 110th Congress owes the nation that result.
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Conclusion:
A date is the surest way to enforce accountability. A date certain, a deadline, is a clear marker that can be understood by all. It is the only way to set a goal and make it stick.
November 2007 is a date the President stated clear as day when he went before the nation to ask for 30,000 more combat troops to put in harms way in Iraq. For the sake of those men and women, we must hold him, at the very least, to that standard.
March 2008 is a date the President rejected in that same speech when he rejected the findings of the Iraq Study Group and the clear will of the American electorate in the elections of 2006. It is a date that Senator Feingold is advocating for withdrawal right now. If March of 2008 is too soon, when will the troops ever come home? What timeframe would ever be acceptable?
This President rejects deadlines not because of any real, pragmatic rationale...he is clear that the Iraqis don't "have all day" (is "all day" the same as two years?); the President rejects deadlines because he rejects all accountability, even to his own words.
The Democratic Party must maintain its unity and stand up for deadlines. Whatever the particulars of the legislative strategy, it is my sincere view that unless the Democratic majorities in Congress use the power of the purse to create a legal obligation for this President using dates certain, that there will be no accountability, and hence no end, to the United States occupation of Iraq.